Accra, Ghana — At a two-day virtual workshop in September 2026, communications and stakeholder-engagement expert Javier Farias gave more than 70 Ghanaian journalists a distinction that could reshape how they cover nuclear power. “A hazard is anything that has the potential to cause harm,” Farias said. Risk, he explained, is the probability or likelihood that harm will occur following exposure to that hazard.
For journalists, that difference is not academic. A hazard does not tell the public how likely harm is. Risk requires context: exposure, probability, severity, protective measures and the circumstances in which people may encounter the hazard. Yet nuclear reporting often collapses that context into a single, frightening word: radiation.
Farias was leading a session called “Nuclear Risk Communication and Public Assurance” at the workshop, held from September 17 to 18, 2026, under the theme “Responsible AI in Journalism: Strengthening Speed, Accuracy, Ethics and Risk Communication in the Nuclear Landscape.” Nuclear Power Ghana (NPG) organised the workshop with the Ghana Journalists Association, Ghana News Agency, Private Newspaper and Online News Association of Ghana and other stakeholders. The workshop’s central lesson was: as Ghana advances its plans to introduce nuclear power into its electricity mix, journalists must report nuclear risk accurately without turning uncertainty into fear—or reassurance into propaganda.
That task is urgent because Ghana’s nuclear programme is no longer abstract. According to the Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NRA), Ghana officially transitioned to Phase 2 of its nuclear power programme in August 2022. Phase 2 involves preparatory work following a policy decision to pursue nuclear power, while Phase 3 covers implementation of the first nuclear power plant.
The NRA describes the Ghana Nuclear Power Programme Organisation (GNPPO) as the body coordinating the programme. It brings together government agencies, private companies, academia and three key institutions: the Nuclear Regulatory Authority, Nuclear Power Ghana and the Nuclear Power Institute. The GNPPO is chaired by the Ministry of Energy.
That institutional separation matters for journalists. Nuclear Power Ghana is the proposed plant’s owner/operator. According to its corporate profile, NPG says it is responsible for project development, feasibility, licensing, regulatory compliance, construction, commissioning, operation, maintenance and eventual decommissioning. The Nuclear Regulatory Authority, meanwhile, has the regulatory role. A responsible news report should therefore not treat the organisation promoting or developing a nuclear project as the only source for determining whether that project is safe.
When the invisible becomes frightening
Radiation presents a communication problem that few hazards do. It cannot ordinarily be detected by human senses. Nuclear accidents, although uncommon, can have potentially serious consequences. Questions about radioactive waste can extend across generations. And the history of nuclear weapons and major accidents has shaped public understanding of the technology. Farias’s presentation identified these characteristics as reasons nuclear risk communication carries a particularly heavy burden.
But technical risk is only one part of the equation. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recognises that public perceptions of nuclear and radiological risk can differ from expert assessments. Its guidance on public communication during nuclear and radiological emergencies notes that perceptions can be influenced by knowledge, beliefs, values, norms and wider social and national circumstances. The distinction matters because a journalist can report accurately about the science while still failing to explain why a community may be worried.
Trust, familiarity, control, uncertainty, fear, understanding and media attention can all influence how people perceive nuclear risks, according to material presented during the Ghana workshop. That means public concern should neither be mocked nor automatically converted into evidence of danger. Fear is real. It is not necessarily a measurement of risk.
Why “there is no risk” is not reassuring enough
There is another trap. In trying to reassure audiences, institutions may be tempted to say that nuclear technology is completely safe or that an accident is impossible. But absolute language can undermine credibility.
The workshop cautioned against unsupported claims such as describing a reactor design as “100% fail-safe” or claiming that a technology makes meltdowns impossible. Instead, communicators should explain the actual safety systems, barriers and procedures behind a claim of safety. This approach is consistent with the IAEA’s own risk communication guidance. The IAEA advises communicators to be honest and says that where information is not known, it is acceptable to say “We don’t know.” It also emphasises openness, transparency, credibility and information that is factual, timely, complete and understandable.
For journalists, this provides a useful test. When an official says “There is no risk,” journalists should establish what risk is being discussed, under what conditions, based on what evidence, who independently verifies the assessment, and what happens if a safety barrier fails. Those questions do not create fear. They create accountability.
Defining safety in nuclear reporting
This is where journalism can make a significant contribution. A nuclear story should move beyond the binary question of whether nuclear power is safe. Instead, it should examine what systems are in place to manage the hazards, what evidence demonstrates their effectiveness, and who is responsible for oversight.
Ghana’s NRA lists 19 infrastructure issues associated with developing a national nuclear power programme under the IAEA framework. They include nuclear safety, regulatory infrastructure, radiation protection, stakeholder involvement, environmental protection, emergency planning, nuclear security and radioactive waste management. These are potentially stronger storylines than simply reporting whether Ghana is “going nuclear.” They allow journalists to investigate the architecture behind nuclear safety: who regulates, who inspects, who responds to an emergency, how radioactive waste will be managed, what happens during a power failure, how communities are informed, what evacuation or protective-action arrangements exist, how independent regulatory oversight is, and what happens when something goes wrong.
The numbers matter, but context matters more
Radiation stories often contain numbers that can sound frightening without context. A report might state that radiation levels reached a particular number of becquerels or microsieverts. But a number without explanation can leave audiences more confused than informed.
The IAEA and other international radiation-protection bodies use specialised units because different quantities are being measured. A journalist must establish whether a reported number refers to radioactive activity, absorbed dose or an effective dose estimate. The same principle applies to statements about health effects. The IAEA explains that health effects from ionising radiation depend on factors including dose and exposure circumstances. At sufficiently high doses, radiation can cause acute tissue effects; lower exposures involve different levels of potential long-term risk. The journalist’s job is therefore not merely to reproduce the number. It is to explain what the number means.
A headline can become a risk multiplier
Consider two possible headlines following an unusual radiation reading: “Radiation Leak Sparks Panic Near Nuclear Facility” and “Radiation Detected Near Facility as Authorities Assess Exposure Levels.” The first immediately establishes an emotional narrative: leak, danger and panic. The second reports what is known while leaving the scientific assessment open. Neither headline should be selected merely because it sounds more dramatic.
The workshop material noted that intense, repetitive and highly visual coverage can amplify perceptions of risk, while contextualised and proportionate coverage can reduce that amplification. The IAEA similarly stresses the importance of providing accurate, timely and understandable information and recognising the different perspectives that emerge around nuclear issues. For journalists, this means the photograph matters too. A picture of a mushroom cloud, people wearing radiation suits or an emergency response team may be visually powerful—but if the story concerns a routine radiation measurement, such an image could create an impression that the event was far more serious than the evidence shows. Visual accuracy is part of scientific accuracy.
The public’s fear is a legitimate story
One of the strongest messages from the Ghana workshop was that public fear should not simply be dismissed as irrational. Farias argued that nuclear risk communication must treat fears as facts about people’s perceptions rather than simply as anxieties to be brushed aside. That does not mean treating every fear as scientific fact. There is a crucial difference.
If a resident says, “I am afraid radiation from a nuclear plant will make my children sick,” the journalist should not report the statement as evidence that the plant will make children sick. But the fear itself is newsworthy. Journalists should explore why the resident feels that way, what information they have received, whether they trust the institutions providing it, what the scientific evidence says, what protections are proposed, what monitoring will occur, and whether the resident can access the monitoring results. That is where journalism moves from simply transmitting information to helping society interrogate it.
Ghana’s energy ambitions make this conversation more urgent
The Ministry of Energy and Green Transition says a national roadmap for integrating nuclear power into Ghana’s energy mix has been developed and accepted by the IAEA. The Ministry describes its responsibility as formulating, implementing, monitoring and evaluating energy policy and coordinating the work of energy-sector agencies. The government’s 2026–2029 sector development plan also includes diversification of baseload electricity with nuclear power technology and identifies public education about nuclear power among the objectives for the period.
The Ministry of Environment, Science and Technology, in collaboration with the NRA, also held an August 2026 engagement on nuclear technology and risk regulation under the theme “Nuclear Technology for a Safer and Sustainable Ghana.” The engagement was intended to increase public awareness of nuclear regulation and demonstrate how regulatory oversight supports the safe application of nuclear science and technology.
Meanwhile, Nuclear Power Ghana which was established in 2018 as the owner/operator of Ghana’s first proposed nuclear power plant, identifies safety, transparency and accountability among its organisational values. These developments mean the public communication challenge is no longer theoretical. As Ghana considers nuclear power, citizens will need information not only about the potential benefits but also about regulation, costs, environmental protection, emergency preparedness, waste management and long-term stewardship. The media will be one of the principal places where those questions are contested and explained.
Trust is built before an emergency
The IAEA’s advice is particularly relevant here: effective nuclear communication should not begin only when something goes wrong. The agency recommends sustained communication, strategic partnerships, consistent messages and engagement with stakeholders. It also stresses that public concerns should be recognised as legitimate and that communication should support dialogue.
The Ghana workshop reached a similar conclusion. Its message was simple: “Dialogue instead of a monologue. Listening instead of talking.” And perhaps the most important line for both institutions and journalists was: “Trust is built before you need it.”
That principle applies well beyond nuclear power. An institution that communicates only during a crisis may find that the public has already formed its own conclusions. An institution that communicates openly before a crisis has a better opportunity to establish credible channels through which information can be understood when uncertainty is highest.
The journalist’s nuclear reporting test
For journalists covering Ghana’s emerging nuclear landscape, the practical test is straightforward. Before publishing, journalists should establish what the hazard is, what the actual risk is, who has measured or assessed it, what the measurement means, what is known, what remains uncertain, which institution is responsible for regulation, what an independent or international source says, whether the headline accurately represents the evidence, whether the image represents the event being reported, whether affected communities have been heard, and whether they have explained what people should do if action is required.
This approach does not require journalists to become nuclear engineers. It requires them to become better interpreters of evidence.
Reporting risk without manufacturing fear
Ghana’s nuclear journey will generate legitimate debate. There will be questions about safety, cost, energy security, environmental protection, radioactive waste, technology choices, emergency preparedness and public participation. Those questions should not be silenced in the name of public assurance. Neither should every concern become evidence of catastrophe.
The task of journalism is to hold the tension. To tell the public what is known without pretending to know what is not. To acknowledge fear without amplifying it. To scrutinise institutions without assuming wrongdoing. To explain hazards without confusing them with risks. And to question reassuring claims without replacing them with alarm.
For a country considering a technology whose risks can be difficult to see and whose consequences can dominate public imagination, that may be one of journalism’s most important responsibilities. Nuclear communication is not about making people afraid. It is not about making people feel safe. It is about giving people enough reliable information to understand the risk for themselves.